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Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between trade openness and economic growth through a
change in institutions. To do so, the paper creates a theory of endogenous institutional change where
there are three social groups, each one owns a specic production factor. An ellite (landowners)
controlling the political power x higher taxes to extract rents from the other groups of the society
(capitalists). This reduces investment in capital, the source for endogenous growth. Endogenous
institutional change is done by allowing the rival group (capitalists) to invest in a military action
which expels out the group in power. The model studies optimal taxation, growth and institutional
change under two scenarios, autarky and free trade.
We calibrate the model according to Western European experience on the XVIth century deriving
that: First: Economies opened to trade will experiment higher growth and faster institutional
change. Second: Economies specializing in manufacturing products tend to grow more and rise the
institutional change earlier. These results are very robust to change in parameter values and it
seems to t quite well with historical experience.
1 Introduction
Recent empirical evidence has pointed out the role played by institutions as one of the main determinants
of the creation of technological progress, the traditional source of growth (Easterly and Levine, 2003).
What the determinants of these institutions are and more precisely, what drives to some countries to
build institutions boostring growth while some others create those ones that lead to stagnation has been
subject of recent theoretical research (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2006)).
The aim of this paper is to study the implications of free trade to the emergence of growth-enhancing
institutions. On the one hand, the paper contributes to the theory of the determinants of institutions
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Gabler, and Carlos Ponce for useful comments and suggestions. I am totally indebted to Mar Cebrián and Joan Rosés for
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by focusing on the role played by openness to international markets. On the other hand, it contributes
to the theory of trade and growth by exploring a new channel through which trade can a¤ect economic
growth: the creation and promotion of institutions boostring growth.
To do so, we build a theory of endogenous growth with endogenous institutional change and we
compare growth rates and the time for institutional change under two scenarios: one in which the
economy is in autarky and another one when the economy opens to international trade. We consider
only the case for small open economies.
The rst step is to determine to what kind of institutions we are referring to and how they are
established in a particular society. Institutions are a very broad concept and according to the denition
of North and Thomas (1972), it englobes any kind of social or legal rule a¤ecting the economic behaviour
of individuals. Since our focus was on growth-enhancing institutions we are gonna restrict our attention
to those having a strong impact on economic growth. There is a general agreement among growth
theorists that the creation of a good system of property rights is by no means one of the fundamentals
of economic growth (Knack and Keefer, (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001), De la
Porta et al. (2004)). Therefore our attention is going to be focused on the emergence of this institution.
The next step is to consider a theory of how this system of property rights is determined in a particular
society. Several approaches have been used to model the creation of institutions but we are going to
take the one recently developped by Acemoglu (2005) since it is the one which seems to t better with
empirical facts. According to this theory there is a conict of economic interests among di¤erent groups
in a particular society which leads to di¤erent preferences for institutions. The established institutional
system will be determined by the group in power, but other social groups could take military actions to
expel out that group from the power and establish its own preferred institutional system.
Assuming that di¤erent sectors have di¤erent scopes of technological progress1 the institutional
system will maximize the growth rate of the economy, when the production possibilities of the group
holding the political power are also the ones of the higher scope of learning. But, this could not be
necessarily the case and this is the relevant case I am going to study 2 In that situation the current
institutional system damages the interests of the social group promoting growth. The model itself
provides a theory of endogenous institutional change where the accumulation of rents will allow the
emerging class to conquier the power by investing some resources on military actions to expel out the
group from the government. When this happens, the new political and institutional regime is established
1 In the seminal paper of Young (1991) this scope becomes endogenously determined. Young (1991) considers a model
in which there is learning by doing in each sector but learning is decreasing with accumulative experience. When learning
arise to an upper bound, improvements on this sector becomes zero. We can consider here that the learning in one sector
is perfectly zero, for simplicity, but a situation in which the scope of learning in one sector is lower than in another sector
will not alter qualitatively the results.
2 In a great part of Western Europe, for example, in the middle and a great part of the modern age, the political power
was mainly an oligarchy formed by those who enjoy landownership. However, the scope of technological progress in the
agricultural sector was limited and subsequent technological improvements even in the agricultural sector were coming
through the creation of capital goods.
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with institutions benetting the interests of the new group in power, whose interests goes hand in hand
with economic growth. In this paper we study how this new institutional regime is achieved and
particularly we focus on the role played by international trade.
The model presented here is a dynamic version of the Ricardo-Viner and Jones specic factor model
with Learning by Doing in the manufacturing sector. Part of this accumulation of knowledge ows to the
agricultural sector by means of technological spillovers. There are three social groups the Landowners,
the Capitalists and the Workers. We study a situation in which the Landowners initially has the
political power and constitutes the ellite. They extract rents from the capitalists imposing a tax on the
manufacturing sector (this tax should be understood as a proxy for some other related institutions, for
example, expropiation etc...). This tax reduces capital accumulation and therefore growth. We introduce
institutional change on the following way: Each period capitalists can nance, with a certain amount
of capital a military intervention which expels out the Landowners establishing their own institutional
system.
The benets of the revolution in this model are proportional to the stock of capital per cápita of the
capitalists. Under no revolution capitalists enjoy a lower interest rate because part of these rents are
going to the Landowners. When the capitalists conquire the power they abolish this tax and therefore
interest rates are higher. Since the gains are proportional to the capital stock we could derive a threshold
level of capital such that above it individuals nd always protable to undertake the revolution.
International trade generates a redistribution of rents in the society that comes from the fact that
production factors are remunerated di¤erently in autarky than in free trade. These redistributional
e¤ects have di¤erent implications for institutional change. On the one hand, if the beneciaries of a
potential growth-boostring institutional change, are also the beneciaries of the redistribution of rents
generated by trade openness, that is in our case the Capitalists, the openness to trade could reduce the
incentives to undertake the revolution because trade is already rising the income of this group being
a potential substitute for the revolution. That is, because the rents of this group has risen under free
trade, the di¤erence between the rents of this group before and after the revolution could be lower
This is the standard e¤ect found in models of institutional change described in Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2006). However, because these models do not generally include dynamic e¤ects they cannot
account for a second but more important e¤ect, if international trade changes the speed of accumulation
of the rents of this social group, the threshold level of capital while higher could be risen earlier and
institutional change will be executed quicker. The international trade pattern will ultimately determine
both the redistribution of rents and the e¤ects on the accumulation of rents, establishing the ultimate
e¤ect on institutional change.
Because the model do not have a closed form solution what I did is to calibrate the model according
to the parameters suggested by Hansen and Prescott (2002) and some other historical studies for the
case of the Western European Atlantic Trade on the XVIth century. Then I will compare the main
predictions of the model to those found in the data to see whether the model is consistent with the
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empirical evidence we have got for that period. Then I will also check whether these predictions hold
for a wide range of parameter values.
This period is very well known by economic historians as the rst era of world globalization. The
discovery of America and new routes to trade with Asia increases world trade volumes on an annual
rate of around 1%, around three times the average annual rate of growth for Europe (ORourke and
Williamsom (2002)) However, among atlantic traders it is generally accepted that economies like Great
Britain and the Netherlands, were introducing institutional changes during the XVIIth and XVIIIth
centuries crucial to the rst industrial revolution, while some other countries like Spain and Portugal,
with a more rigid system and a smaller middle class did not generate this change3 . To explain why
Great Britain and the Netherlands did it and why Spain and Portugal did not, has been a challenge to
economists and historians. In a very interesting paper, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) provides
empirical evidence supporting the fact that the role played by international trade in the transition to
modern growth of the western economies was non negligible. Moreover among those traders not all of
them benetted equally being England and the Netherlands those having higher benets. The paper
outline the role of initial political di¤erences in the di¤erent experiences across Great Britain and the
Netherlands and Spain and Portugal.
Our main results of the theoretical model state that: First, the disincentive e¤ect is denitely less
important that the growth e¤ect, so that as long as international trade generates a higher growth rate,
the institutional change will be given earlier. Secondly that international trade generates a positive
growth e¤ect that it comes through a general reduction on taxes or expropiation. This e¤ect will imply
that the general e¤ect of trade on growth will be positive even if the economy specializes in agricultural
goods, something quite di¤erent to the standard result of two sector models of trade and growth. Third,
the e¤ect on growth is larger when the economy specializes in manufacturing goods, so we should observe
divergence between economies exposed to overseas trade according to the specialization pattern. These
e¤ects are qualitatively robust to changes in parameter values.
The implied predictions for the case studied are: Those economics participating in overseas trade
should have grown more and given the institutional change earlier assuming similar initial political
conditions. That it seems to t quite well with the empirical studies carried out by Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2005). Second, we should observe divergent growth and institutional experiences across
atlantic traders based on specialization patterns: That it seems to t as well with the empirical evidence.
While economies like Great Britain and the Netherlands were specialized in exporting manufacturing
3See for example, North and Thomas (1972), for an extensive survey on the di¤erent institutional environments in-
troduced by the Dutch and the English from the XVIth. Cameron (1999) also provides a global perspective of the issue.
Acemoglu, Johson and Robinson (2003) provides a detailed survey of the di¤erent attempts to the elites established already
in the power to avoid the introduction of such institutional arrangements.
For the case of Spain and Portugal, North and Thomas (1972) provides an extensive analysis. For the particular case
of Spain see Yun (2002).
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goods, economies like Spain or Portugal were engaged in trade mainly based on primary products, as
wine, sherry, wool, oil, and metals like gold and silver in the rst one, etc... (Wallerstein, 1974; Yun,
2002). Many references talked about a decline in the industrialists sectors for the spanish economy from
XVIth century on , (Lynch (1991), Hamilton (1934), Alvarez and Prados (2007)). and the trasatlantic
trade concentrated in the city of Seville was mainly based on the export of agricultural products and
some manufacturing products. From the second half of the XVIth century, the role played by Spanish
manufactures in the colonial trade was notably quite low and most of the manufactures exported to the
colonies came from Great Britain, the Netherlands4 .
Related theoretical literature has explored also the relationship between trade, institutions and
growth but focusing on di¤erent historical episodes and di¤erent institutions. For example the work
by Falkinger and Grossman (2005) have explored the e¤ects of trade openness on policies promoting
human capital accumulation in economies with di¤erent institutional settings. The interaction between
factor endowments and the institutional setting will determine the e¤ect that trade openness has on
economic growth. Segura-Cayuela (2006) extends Acemoglu (2005) model to study whether property
rights are determined di¤erently under free trade and autarky across di¤erent political regimes and its
consequences for output and welfare. According to this model in oligarchic societies openness to trade
can reduce welfare by rising the incentives of the oligarchs to increase taxes. Although, his model omits
capital accumulation and growth he focuses on the emergence of the same kind of institutions. Di¤erent
from all of them our model rather than taking political institutions as given, it studies the consequences
of openness to trade on the proccess of institutional change.
While it is true that we have focused in a particular historical period for simplicity, the implications
of the model could be consistent with many other di¤erent historical episodes. Another interesting
example can be found in the expansion of the agricultural trade of the Eastern European and Baltic
economies during the XIVth and XVth centuries. In these countries the openness to international trade,
rather than improving the conditions of the peasants and the merchant class, improved the conditions of
the lords and the landowners, thereby delaying institutional change in these countries. The international
trade pattern that these countries established with the economies of Western Europe was mainly based
on the export of cereals, above all wheat, and the import of ellaborated products5 . On the other hand
it is generally accepted among historians, that feudalism was reinforced during the XVIth and XVIIth
4Many of them violated the state monopoly of the Casa de Contratacion by contracts with the spanish traders (Yun,
2002, Lynch (1991), Hamilton (1934) etc..). From the second half of the XVIth century Spain starts to import mainly textile
manufactures, cotton manufactures, etc.. (Braudel, 1972). Shipping services had to be purchased from the Netherlands
and Britain since the Spanish eets, one of the most important industries at that time were insucient. Others were passed
through the Canary Islands which has an independent trade with America, by 1607.
5Hybel (2002) claims referring to the Netherlands: "Generations of historians have been of the opinion that from the
mid-twelfth century the Netherlands maintained an industrial population that could not be fed from domestic agricultural
production alone.[:::] These regions became seriously dependent on grain supplies from the outside world , a development
which brought about an increasing ow of grain from eastern to western Europe.
Later on when talking about the trade pattern corroborates that: "The bulk commodities from Scandinavia and the
Baltic region were exchanged in western Europe for luxury products -in particular, cloth produced in the Netherlands and
after 1300 increasingly in England. "
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centuries in Eastern european economies. We believe that the international trade pattern benecial to
the feudal lords was crucial in the reinforcement of the existing regime during these centuries.
The baseline model of institutional change is developed in section 1. Section 2 extends the model
to a small open economy and we study what are the conditions under institutional change is delayed or
fosterred. Section 3 concludes.
2 The Economy
2.1 Production
The model builds on a dynamic version of the Ricardo-Viner-Jones specic factor model with learning by
doing à la Romer (1986) in the manufacturing sector. There are two sectors which uses specic factors
of production but they compete for labor which is mobile across sectors. The technologies implemented
in each sector are characterized by the following functional forms:
Y At = T

t
 
AtL
A
t
1 
(1)
YMt = K

t
 
BtL
M
t
1 
(2)
In this model the endogenous formation of technological progress by rm private decisions is not
considered. Along the historical period of reference, private R&D investment was reasonably low, and
advances of technology were mainly the result of accumulative experience. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that advances in this economy comes from a learning by doing proccess. Following the standard
specication of Romer (1986) I assume that this proccess was labor-augmenting and that part of this
learning by doing was also transferred to the agricultural sector, therefore:
Bt = Kt (3)
At = K

t ; 0    1:
, where  measures the degree of inter-sectorial technological spillovers and it is assumed to be at
most one.
2.2 Consumption
Individuals in this economy, live for one period/generation and then die but capital accumulation is
guaranteed by means of bequests to the future generation. 6 They are homogeneous in taste but
6This kind of preferences are very used in the literature on income distribution and growth and very well known as
Warmglowutility functions. The main implication of these preferences is that individuals derived utility from leaving
bequests by itself (Joy of giving). In an outstanding paper Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko¤ (1997) provides empirical
evidence supporting this kind of preferences. (more on historical evidence supporting this kind of preferences).
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di¤er in the sources of income, the access to asset markets, and the initial endowment of political
power. According to these characteristics we can identify three kind of agents: landowners, workers and
capitalists. Population for each group is normalized to one for simplicity.
In this economy production factors are specic to individuals belonging to a particular social group.
This means that access to the land is restricted to the landowners as long as access to capital goods
are restricted to capitalists. There is a great consensus among economic historians and economist that
this was the case for the preindustrial societies. Crouzet (1985) nds for example that for the case of
the rst industrial revolution, during the period (1750-1850) only 3% of the enterpreneurs were part of
the upper class and less than 10% were descendants of landowning ellites. In another interesting paper,
Doepke and Zilibotti (2004) discuss about the tiny role played by the landowners ellite and aristocracy
in the early stages of the industrial revolution.
In the initial period, there is an equal distribution of land and land can be exchanged among landown-
ers at the price of tt: They can also explote the use of it contracting labor force and producing agricultural
goods. We denote as dt the rents per unit of land obtained from the production proccess. On the other
hand, capitalists can explote also the use of capital by contracting labor force and producing manufac-
turing goods. We denote by rt the rents per unit of capital obtained in the production proccess. Both
landowners and capitalists can leave bequests by means of land and capital respectively to the future
generation. The labor force is supplied by workers which do not have any access to either capital or
land goods.
The way in which we are going to represent an imperfect system of property rights is by means of
a tax. The group in power, that in this case it is the landowners, can take in ownership a part of the
total output of the rival sector denoted by  t. But di¤erent from conventional taxes these are gonna
be decided at the beginning of the period, before the production and consumption decissions are made
and they last for the whole generation of individuals7 .
For simplicity, I am going to suppose Cobb-Douglas preferences for both nal consumption goods,
and in the case of the capitalists, also for the investment good. Landowners maximize:
max
cAAt;c
M
At;Tt+1
lnCAt + lnT
i
t+1
s:t:CAt =
 
cAAt
  
cMAt
1 
s:t:ptc
A
At + c
M
At + ttT
i
t+1 = (tt + dt)T
i
t +  tY
M
t
where, CAt is the total consumption index of the landowners, cAAt; c
M
At; are both respectively the
agricultural and the manufacturing consumption goods of the landowners and  will be the proportion
of expenditure dedicated to the agricultural good.
7We do not allow for holdup problems in this model..
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Each of the workers are endowed with one unit of labor. We denote with subscript L; the allocation
referred to workers. They cannot leave heritage to future generations. They solve:
max lnCLt
s:t:CLt =
 
cALt
  
cMLt
1 
ptc
A
Lt + c
M
Lt  wt
On the other hand, capitalists (denoted with subscript k), can accumulate physical capital. We
assume full depreciation of capital as Hansen and Prescott (2002)8 . Capitalists solve the problem:
max
cAAt;c
M
At;kt+1
lnCkt + lnKt+1
s:t:Ckt =
 
cAkt
  
cMkt
1 
s:t:ptc
A
kt + c
M
kt +Kt+1  rtKt
2.3 Solving the model
Solving the problem of consumers for each group give us the following demand functions for each
consumption good:
cAit = 
Eit
pt
cMit = (1  )Eit
where Eit; is expenditure dedicated to consumption. Notice that for the workers we have that
consumption expenditure is equal to income, but for the capitalists or the landowners, who they make
investments too, we have that:
Ekt =
rtKt
2
EAt =
(tt + dt)Tt +  tY
M
t
2
Kt+1 =
rtKt
2
(4)
T it+1 =
(tt + dt)T
i
t +  tY
M
t
2tt
and considering a case when there is no depreciation, we have that:
8Due to the fact that the time that passes between one period and another in this model is equivalent to the lyfe
expectancy of a generation, which here we normalize to 70 years, the capital that it can remains from the previous
generation to the future generation is negligible.
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Kt+1
Kt
=
rt
2
:
Notice that the interest rate must be bigger than two. A similar condition is assumed in AK models,
and given that a period it is a generation here, this value is rather plausible.9 Calling Cjt =
X
i=A;k;L
cjit;
j = A;M; we have that:
CAt
CMt
=

1  
1
pt
: (5)
Landowners in the agricultural sector maximize:
max
LAt ;Tt
pt (Tt)
  
AtL
A
t
1    wtLAt :
and given  ; maximize:
max
LMt ;Kt
(1   t) (Kt)
 
BtL
M
t
1    wtLMt   rtKt
Assuming perfect competition and the fact that in equilibrium B and A are given by the expression
above, rental prices for each factor under an interior solution are given by:
dt = 
1 pt (Tt)
 1
(Kt)
(1 )  
LAt
1 
(6)
wt = (1  )pt (Tt) (Kt)(1 )
 
LAt
 
= (1  )(1   t)Kt
 
LMt
 
(7)
rt = 
1 (1   t)
 
LMt
1 
(8)
To close the model we impose the market clearing conditions for labor and nal consumption goods:
LAt + L
M
t = 1 (9)
CAt = (Tt)

(Kt)
(1 )  
LAt
1 
(10)
CMt +Kt+1 = Kt
 
LMt
1 
(11)
We assume that the total endowment of land is xed over time, which implies that:
X
i=1
T it+1 = Tt (12)
Manipulating (5), (10), (11), (8), and (4) prices are given by:
pt =


1  
 
(Kt)
(1 (1 ))
(Tt)

!
LMt
LAt
1 
1  (1   t)
2

(13)
9AK models assume the condition rt > ; for a positive growth rate which it means that the technology must be enough
productive for the individuals to invest in capital accumulation. Later on we calibrate the model imposing the duration
of the generation up to 70 years which implies an interest rate of 1%.
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Taxes are going to a¤ect optimal prices through two channels. Let denote the rst channel as the
demand channel, where the e¤ect comes from the e¤ect of taxes on the relative aggregate demand of
agriculture and manufactured products. As you can see from (8) and (11) the rise in taxes reduces the
demand of investment, reducing the relative demand of manufactured products and therefore rising the
price of the agricultural goods pt (Last element of equation (13)).
The second channel, denoted as the supply channel, comes from the e¤ect of taxes in the optimal
reallocation of workers across sectors. Because taxation reduces the marginal productivity of labor
in the manufacturing sector, an increase in taxes shifts workers from the manufacturing sector to the
agricultural sector. Going to the wage equation and using the market clearing condition for the labor
market it can be got:
LMt
LAt
=

1  


2(1   t)
2  (1   t)

(14)
Notice that due to the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences, the allocation of labor across sectors
do not depend on the endowments of the xed factor. In a case with no taxes more labor is allocated
to the manufacturing sector than to the agricultural sector because manufacturers produces also the
investment good. However, taxes are shifting labor from manufacturing to agriculture. Using (9), it
follows that:
LAt =
(2  (1   t)) 
(2  (2 + ))(1   t) + 2 (15)
LMt =
2(1   t)(1  )
(2  (2 + ))(1   t) + 2 (16)
therefore, an increase in taxes, will increase labor in the agricultural sector, increasing the supply
and reducing the relative price pt:
This latter e¤ect can be seen substituting the equation (13) for the expression of the optimal labor
allocation across sector, (equation (14)):
pt =
 

1  
 
(Kt)
(1 (1 ))
(Tt)

!
2  (1   t)
2

(1   t)1 
!
(17)
Taking derivatives, it can be shown that it is monotonically decreasing in taxes for a low value of .
Proposition 1 dptd < 0; if  <
2
3 t :
The sign of the derivative depends on the relative strength of both e¤ects, the supply and the demand
one. Looking at condition (13) it can be noticed that for the extreme cases  = 0;  = 1; the e¤ect is
negative and positive respectively. When  is low, the e¤ect in the supply side, is very strong as it can
be seen in the second element of condition (13) while the e¤ect in the demand side, the third term in the
same equation is very small given as a consequence, a decrease in the relative price of the agricultural
good (an increase in the relative price of the manufacturing good). Notice that, the rank of possible
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limits for  are  2 ( 23 ; 1): Since no empirical evidence has reported such a high value for  even in
recent times we can consider the derivative to be negative. The law of motion of capital is given by:
Kt+1
Kt
=
 (1   t)
 
LMt
1 
2
=
 (1   t)

2(1 t)
(2 )(1 t)+2
1 
2
(18)
Since all the landowners are identical in preferences and endowments, in equilibrium the distribution
of land across landowners will not be altered and the prices of the land are given by the expression:
tt =
dtTt +  tY
M
t
Tt
which is just the rents that each landowner receives for using the land in the agricultural sector and
the political rents associated with the land ownership.
Total output in nominal terms is given by:
Yt = ptTt
 
LAt
1 
+ Kt
 
LMt
1 
: (19)
Looking at condition (18) it can be seen that the level of  t is crucial in the dynamics of the model.
Because taxes are creating a distortion in both production and consumption, the tax rate that maximizes
aggregate output is  = 0:10The next section explains how the tax rate  ; is determined.
2.4 The political system and the level of  t
In this section we are going to discuss how  t is determined.
Substituting the optimality conditions and rearranging terms we have that the indirect utility func-
tion is given by:
V At = ln

IAt
(pt)


where for the case of the capitalists is given by:
V kt = ln

Ikt
(pt)


where IAt ; I
k
t ; are the respective income of the landowners and capitalists.
Proposition 2 Let V kt be the indirect utility function of the capitalists:Then:
dV Kt
d < 0
Proof. The result is straightforward taking derivatives with respect to  t in capitalists income and
rearranging terms. See appendix.
10Although the agents are not maximizing output given the positive externality derived from the LBD assumption, this
kind of taxonomy will not help to overcome the externality, and what´s more it gets it worst because an increase in taxes
diverts resources from investment to consumption. Therefore the tax rate maximizing output is zero.
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Taxes reduces nominal income through a reduction in the interest rate reducing capitalists indirect
utility function but taxes reduces the price of the agricultural good having a positive e¤ect in the
capitalists indirect utility function. However, the income e¤ect is stronger than the substitution e¤ect
and the net e¤ect is negative.
Substituting the value of IAt given by the budget constraint of the landowners we have that:
V At = 
0 + ln

 (pt)
1   
LAt
1 
(Tt)

(Kt)
(1 )
+  t (pt)
 
Kt
 
LMt
1 
(20)
where  0 is a constant from the point of view of taxation. Notice that this expresion is ambiguous
in the level of taxes  t: Taxes here a¤ects the utility of landowners through three mechanisms. The
rst and the second one are already very well known in the literature. The rst one is called, Revenue
extraction and it is the direct impact of a rise in taxes on scal income which ceteris paribus is positive.
The second one is called factor price manipulation: An increase in taxes, increases the amount of labor
in the agricultural sector, due to a reduction in the marginal productivity of labor in the manufacturing
sector. The ellites therefore has the incentive to rise taxes in order to attract labor into the agricultural
sector, rising the rents from the land. However, by reducing the mass of workers in the manufacturing
sector, scal income decreases and the net e¤ect is not clear.
The third one is the e¤ect on the relative price. Changes in the relative price will have a direct e¤ect
on income and utility (i.e.: An increase in taxes, decreases the price of the agricultural good, reducing
the nominal rents of the land but rising the indirect utility) and an indirect e¤ect through changes in the
reallocation of labor across activities (i.e. The rise in taxes, decreases prices, decreasing the value of the
marginal productivity of labor in the agricultural sector and rising labor in the manufacturing sector).
As you can see from equation (20) either the net direct e¤ect or the net indirect e¤ect of taxes through
this channel on landowners indirect utility is ambiguous. This is not usually present in the literature
because these models treats the two consumption good as perfect substitutes for simplication.
However notice that it is precisely through changes in relative prices that international trade will
change the optimal tax chosen by the landowners having consequences for growth. When the economy
opens to trade, prices will be determined by the rest of the world (a small open economy is going to be
considered). This implies that landowners cannot a¤ect prices when deciding about taxes having two
important consequences: On the one hand, landowners cannot rise the value of scal income by putting
higher taxes which decrease prices. On the other hand, landowners cannot manipulate taxes to a¤ect
labor allocation across sectors.
Using the expression for prices (13) and making several rearrangements you can get the expression:
V At = Ln
 



1  

2  (1   t)
2
(1 )
+ 

2
2  (1   t)
 !
+
Ln
 
LMt
(1 )(1 )  
LAt
(1 )
which after manipulating, substituting (15), (16) and substracting the constant terms, the expression
remains:
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V At = Ln
 
(1   t)(1 )(1 )
(2  (1   t))
 
(2  (1   t)) + 2 t(1  )
((2 + )   )(1   t) + 2(1  ))1 
!!
The appendix solves for the optimal tax rate and it shows that it is interior and unique for the
numerical example considered below. Given that it was not possible to nd an analytical expression
for the value of  ; a numerical solution was carried out. Hansen and Prescott (2002) uses the value of
 = 0:4 , for simulating a similar model in which the manufacturing sector uses the same technology,
so we will take also that but we make robust check with di¤erent levels of . For the parameter  we
have taken the value of 0:7 suggested on the new database on european consumption baskets built by
Peter H. Lindert11 . For calibrating the technological constant ; I take the Maddison´s estimate for the
average per capita GDP growth rate for the Western Europe of 0.14% per year. Because in this model
each period is considered as a generation I will use the Hansen and Prescott (2002) value for a duration
of generation that is 70 years12 . The following table gives gross growth rates per year under no taxes
(what it would be the economy after institutional change), under optimal taxes (what it would be the
economy before institutional change), and labor allocations for this numerical example:
.
regime  Lmtaxes Lataxes rtaxes gtaxes
taxes 0.7709 0.0933 0.9067 1.0113 1.0013
notaxes 0 0.3488 0.6512 1.0445 1.0342
Proposition 3  = maxV Ft () 6= 0; 1 , and it is independent of Kt; T: and unique for the parameter
case studied
Proof. See appendix.
Notice that the optimal tax is quite high: Population in each activity under a situation of autarky
and taxation, is given by 9% where 91% is dedicated to agriculture. Using the share of population living
in medium sized cities, as a proxy for the share of the labor force dedicated to the manufacturing sector
reveals that the results of the model are not too far from real data. The share of population living
in citites with more than 5000 individuals in the XVIth; according to Maddison (2005) for England is
around 16% very similar to the 9% per cent given by the model. The second row of the table presents
the prediction of the model under a situation of no struggling institutions. We can see that in fact bad
institutions are making the economy to grow 3 percentual points less per year.
2.5 How the Capitalists can reach the power
Capitalists can rise to power by investing m units of the capital stock in order to nance an army
which gets the monopoly of military strength in the state. We use capital stock units because at the
11This database is collecting data on budgets of individuals belonging to di¤erent social classes and in di¤erent countries
across di¤erent periods of time. Data reports di¤erences by social groups and by countries although these di¤erences are
not very big, but all of the estimations, suggest a value for  between 0.6 and 0.8.
12Qualitative results are not a¤ected by the duration of a period although this will have important consequences in the
quantitative results.
13
beginning of the period, when this choice is made, the only asset individuals have to invest is the stock
of capital they inherit from the past generation. The parameter m will be interpreted as di¤erent initial
political conditions, (i.e. military force strength,size etc..): Economies with strong state conditions (huge
requirements of military force) could need more time for a revolution and a change in the political power,
because the cost is higher. On the other hand a reasonable assumption is going to be made: capitalists
cannot borrow for making this investment.
Two conditions are needed to have a revolution in this economy: rstly, it must be protable and
secondly it can be nanced. Mathematically means that:
V kt ( = 0; I
k
t = rt(kt  m))  V kt ( = t ; Ikt = rt kt) > 0
kkt > m
The rst condition is easy to derive:
Ln

rt(k
k
t  m)
rt kkt

(pt )

(pt)


> 0
which implies:
kt  k = mr
r  r (21)
where:
 =

pt
pt

=

(1  )1 

2  (1  )
2  

Condition (21) just tell us that the benets of the revolution must be higher than the cost. The
cost is given by m units of capital, which can be used in the production proccess to obtain mr units
of manufacturing goods. To translated into utils we need to divide by the price index of the economy
which is given by: (pt)

(1)1  = (pt)

: On the other hand, we have the benets, which are given by
the di¤erence in rates of returns between a situation with no taxes and with taxes. The parameter 
corrects for the di¤erential in prices under both situations.
When we remove taxes there is, on the one hand an increase in the interest rate, which increases
capitalists income. These benets are proportional to the stock of capital that each individual has; on
the other hand there is a rise in the price of the agricultural good, what it decreases capitalists real rents.
From previous analysis we have derived that the latter cannot overcome the rst e¤ect and therefore
capitalists are better o¤ with lower taxes.
There is a threshold level of capital stock that would make the revolution protable. This is just the
consequence of having the gains proportional to the individual capital stock. Interesting is to see that
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the larger the interest rate in autarky, the larger the threshold level of capital. This is very similar to
that found in Acemoglu (2006). The larger the interest rate in autarky the lower the gains from the
revolt because the di¤erence between the interest rate before and after the institutional change is smaller.
Therefore, the more capital you need to have to compensate the revolution investment. Notice also that
the larger/ the smaller the price of the agricultural goods the more/the less costly is to undertake the
revolution.
Taking into account the two constraints it is important to realize that the rst one is redundant
unless the revolution is not protable at all (i:e:; r > r): In order to have an institutional change the
following condition must hold:
kt  k = m:
 =
1
1  rr  1
One of the may drawbacks of this experiment and mainly of the whole literature when carrying these
models to the data, is the fact that it is di¢ cult to give a value to the cost of the revolution m: Main
results do not depend on the parameter m at least qualitatively. For comparative purposes let us denote
n as the number of years that it takes to arrive to k: This is given by:
n =
ln
ln(1 + g)
+
ln(m=kt)
ln(1 + g)
(22)
2.6 Steady state
The assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences it allows us to dene a BGP when all variables grows at
a constant rate. In concrete, under this assumption our model is a version of a standard two sector AK
model except from the fact that when the institutional change is done there will be a jump in the growth
rate, that is: rst the economy will grow at the constant growth rate g1: Capitalists will accumulate
more and more capital up to they are able to get the political power. When kt = k; the revolution
arrive, the ellites are removed from the power and as a consequence the capitalists will set the tax rate
to zero. There will be a jump to a new steady state when the growth rate will be denitely higher and
equal to g2. A mathematical proof of these statements is given in the following proposition:.
Denition 4 A BGP for this economy is a situation where the variables, LMt ; L
A
t ;  t; are constant and
the variables CAt ; C
M
t ; pt; dt; wt; grows at a constant rate.
Proposition 5 A BGP for this economy exists and it is unique.
Proof. From the maximization problem of the indirect utility function of the farmers it is easy to see
that  is interior and constant, since the value function only depend on constant parameters.
Looking at LMt ; L
A
t ;it is easy to see that the allocation of workers across sectors is also constant
because only depends on  ; :
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Substituting (13) in (19):
Y =

(2 (1 )+2(1 )
2(1 )
  
LMt
1 
K = DK
which as standard in AK models is linear in capital stock. The same properties of a two-sector AK
model then applies and let denote Yt+1Yt =
Kt+1
Kt
= g.
Looking at ( 10) it can be noticed that production
CAt+1
CAt
=
Y At+1
Yt
= (1   )g is also constant, and
substituting (4), (8), in (11), it can be seen that
CMt+1
CMt
=
YMt+1
YMt
= g constant.
Since pt = #K
1 (1 )
t you can get that it grows at (1  (1 ))g, and dt; wt are a linear function
of pt; K
(1 )
t and another constant variables, therefore both of them are also growing at the same
constant rate g:
When the constraint kt  k holds, the growth rate of the economy is given by g = g1 = (1 
)(LMt )
1 
2 :
Because k; does not depend on capital, and Kt+1Kt = g grows constantly, then k
 will be rised at a nite
time.
When k > k;  = 0; in steady state and the growth rate of the economy is given by g =




2(1 )
2 
1 
where the condition ;  >
 
1

 1
1 

2 
2(1 )

is needed to have a positive growth
rate (this condition is similar to the condition r > ; standard in the AK models. )
3 Small open economy
Let consider now the case of a small open economy which opens to trade and the equilibrium price of
the rest of the world is given by pt : Consumer decissions will not be altered with trade openness. Firms
keep on allocating labour sources according to the following condition:
LAt
LMt
=
 
pt T

(1   t)K(1 (1 ))t
! 1

(23)
where the price now is given by the above denition and therefore exogenous. Notice that when the
price for the agricultural good rises, the economy switches resources from the manufacturing into the
agricultural sector. Landowners x taxes according to the new economic equilibrium. Manipulating (26)
and the market clearing condition for labor and substituting in the utility function of the landowners it
remains:
V At = 
0 + Ln

 (pt )
1   
LAt
1 
K
(1 )
t Tt +  t (p

t )
 
Kt
 
LMt
1 
where now prices are given by pt and therefore exogenous in the model.
One of the nice properties of assuming the Cobb-Douglas production function was that labor alloca-
tions and therefore taxes do not depend on factor endowments and therefore they were constant along
time. Prices were doing the work. In some sense this property is lost when analysing the case of a small
open economy. Prices are exogenous and therefore do not depend on national factor endowments any
more. This has the uncomfortable property that now taxes at each point in time depends on the capital
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stock. Taxes, labor allocations, and the growth rate of the economy changes over time making di¢ cult
to provide conclusions about the transition. Taking the rst order conditions for taxes, the dynamics of
the system, can be characterized by a system of two di¤erence equations given by:
(ptT
)
1


(1 + ) t + 
2(1   t)  2

= (1   t)
1+


K
(1 (1 ))
t
 1

(24)
Kt+1
Kt
=
 
(1   t) 1
2
!0B@

K
(1 (1 ))
t
 1

(ptT )
1
 +

(1   t)K(1 (1 ))t
 1

1CA
1 
(25)
The following proposition reports interesting properties with respect to the optimal tax, :
Proposition 6  is interior, monotonically increasing with Kt; and monotonically decreasing with pt .
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that whenever prices decrease or physical capital increases, labor allocation in the manufac-
turing sector increases, and also the value of scal income in real terms increases, increasing marginal
income coming from taxation and rising the incentives to put higher taxes. In that case, the economy
starts to specialize in manufacturing, landowners observe a general rise in the returns to capital and
they try to tax more the capitalists.
Given that taxes generally depend on capital stock at each point in time the model does not present
a constant BGP through the period we study. To restablish constant BGP and therefore make the
model a little bit more tractable, we are gonna assume that the price of the rest of the world moves
according to: .
_pt
pt
= (1  (1  ))
_Kt
Kt
Notice that from (26- 25) it can be seen that taxes, the growth rate of capital stock and labor
allocations are constant. This special case is studied in the following section.
3.1 A special case
Let consider now the previous case when the price for the rest of the world is given by pt = qt,
where qt will be the autarkic price at the time of openness t. Dening qt = KtT
1 (1 )
; where
 =


1 
 
2 (1 )
2

(1   )1 ;and  is the value of the optimal tax in the autarkic case.
Intersectorial labor market allocation is given by:
LAt
LMt
=


1  
 1

(26)
which turns out to be independent of the capital stock again and to be constant along time. Notice,
however that intersectorial labor allocation depends now on : When  = 1; prices do not change and
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labor market allocations will be equal if  = : When the economy opens to trade if  is bigger than
one (as a consequence of trade the price of the agricultural good rises up), there is a shift of labour
from the manufacuring sector to the agricultural one. As a consequence our economy will produce more
agricultural goods and less manufacturing products. The reversed case will occur if  is less than one.
To derive taxes and the law of movement of capital stock we come back to the system previously derived
but with the new expression for prices:
()
1


(1 + ) t + 
2(1   t)  2

= (1   t)
1+
 (27)
Kt+1
Kt
=
 
(1   t) 1
2
! 
1
()
1
 + ((1   t))
1

!1 
(28)
Intersectorial labor allocation and taxes depend only on ;  and : We are going to focus on the
analysis of the economy before the institutional change has been carried out, where as we have com-
mented before, for the special case of this section, the dynamic properties of the model are equal to the
case in autarky. As in the previous section we carried out a numerical exercise for the value of  = 0:4
and  = 0:7, allowing for di¤erent values of : The table below shows the value for taxes and the rest of
the variables as a function of :
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 2 2.5
 0.7966 0.7029 0.6401 0.6053 0.5797 0.5325 0.5259
LMt 0.8104 0.6608 0.5265 04119 0.3193 0.0977 0.0603
r 1.0284 1.0323 1.0329 1.0322 1.0309 1.0220 1.018
g 1.0183 1.0220 1.0227 1.0220 1.0207 1.0120 1.008
Looking at the table we can see that depending on the specialization pattern of the economy, trade
will have di¤erent e¤ects on the growth rate of the economy. First of all it is worthy to mention that
as a consequence of the openness to trade in a small open economy the landowners x lower taxes.
As commented before when the economy opens to trade the landowners no longer are able to a¤ect
output prices. Since an increase in taxes in autarky was pushing down prices incresing scal income in
nominal and in real terms, landowners had incentives to put higher taxes. Openness to trade reduces
the incentives to tax higher because real scal income no longer will increase with taxes. When trade
prices have not changed ( = 1) but landowners consider they cannot manipulate prices any more, they
x taxes almost 20% lower than before.
However, when the price is not equal to the one in autarky we have important realloction e¤ects
in the labor market which will have important e¤ects on growth through both the direct e¤ect of the
reallocation of labor and the indirect e¤ect on taxes. As we have derived in the previous section whenever
the price pt falls, or the economy specializes in manufacturing goods, labor in the manufacturing sector
increases due to a rise in the real price of manufacturing goods. However, the fall in prices rises marginal
income coming from taxation what it will increase taxes. This reduces labor in the manufacturing sector.
The nal e¤ect on labor, the interest rate and growth is ambiguous then for that case. On the one hand,
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taxes are higher but on the other hand the value of the marginal productivity of the manufacturing
sector is also higher.
An interesting result is that the e¤ect on reallocation of labor dominates but only up to a certain
point when it is the rise in taxes the e¤ect that dominate. That is, in this model, a higher degree of
specialization in manufacturing not always implies a higher growth rate although it is always superior
than the one in autarky.
For the case of the specialization in agriculture things are di¤erent. Taxes will fall as landowners
want to push investment since this will imply larger scal income. However the rise in agricultural
prices rises wages deppresing the labor allocation to the manufacturing sector. The latter e¤ect cannot
overcome the rst one so that the net e¤ect is negative.
4 The e¤ects on institutional change.
Two e¤ects can be perfectly distinguished on the time for the institutional change. On the one hand,
international trade eliminates any link between agricultural prices and taxes. In autarky, eliminating
taxes was having a cost since lower taxes implies higher prices. Under free trade eliminating taxes will
not have any e¤ect on prices, so trade eliminates this cost. On the other hand, international trade by
reducing taxes rises the growth rate of output through an increase in the interest rate. This has an
ambiguous e¤ect on institutional change: the higher the growth rate of output, the easier is to rise the
threshold level of capital stock to give the revolution, but as commented before, the larger the interest
rate the lower the gains from the revolution and therefore, the less protable is to do it.
This can be easily seen in equation (22). Notice that since price without taxes are larger than with
taxes (Prop.2) then  < 1: With free trade  = 1; so, this reduces : On the other hand, we know
that r increases so this increases : The e¤ects on n are therefore ambiguous because the increase in
g reduces m but the increase in  increases n:
Since (1+ g0) > (1+ g); in order to show that n0 < n; we need just to show that Ln
0
Ln(1+g0) <
Ln
Ln(1+g) .
What we have found is that this is always satisfed in our numerical example. This can be observed
in the following table:
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 2 2.5
af 10.95 12.31 12.94 13.16 9.9440 12.66 25.45
bf 55.24 45.95 44.51 45.95 43.104 83.83 125.45
where the term af = Ln
0
Ln(1+g0) ; and the term b
f = 1Ln(1+g0) : The autarkic values for a and b are
194.75 and 769.73 respectively. Notice that the di¤erence between those values in autarky and in free
trade are very big. This is due to the fact that the e¤ect that trade has on the growth rate is quite high
what it accelerates the proccess. In concrete the values for the constant 0 are higher than the one for
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 but the acceleration in the growth rate makes the "a0s" to be smaller. Notice that the fact that the
time for institutional change is shorten in every economy is independent of the institutional change cost
m:However in assesing quantitative predictions for the time of the institutional change, we should give
values for the parameter m:
Since it is the e¤ect in the growth rate the dominant e¤ect, all conclusions relative to specialization
pattern discussed before applies also to the institutional change argument, that is: specializing in
manufacturing goods, rises the growth rate, accelerating output and the time for the institutional
change. As before the degree of specialization matters. For high changes in relative prices, the growth
rate could fall desaccelerating output and delaying the time for the institutional change.
Trade will have always positive e¤ects on the time for the institutional change because the e¤ects of
the tax reduction on the growth rate. But paralell to the e¤ects on growth, the specialization pattern
matters for the institutional change. That is, ceteris paribus, economies specializing in agricultural goods
will always give the institutional change later on time. Therefore this theory outlines the importance of
trade patterns and specialization on the creation of a good system of property rights. In this economy,
di¤erences on trade patterns across countries create divergent growth and institutional experiences across
countries.
These qualitative results seems to be very robust to changes in parameter values. In order to verify
this, we have carried out several experiments. First we have let  vary for a xed value of ; and we
have carried out the experiment for two values of  (since the standard values for this parameter are
between 0.3 and 0.4) : Secondly we have xed  but we have let  to vary and we have carried out the
experiment for two values of : In all the experiments carried out the results keep in qualitative terms.
While the predictions of the model seems to be right in qualitative terms, the empirical evidence
however shows that our results overstate the impact of trade. First of all, taking Maddison (2001)
estimates for the growth rates for the western economies all over the period (1500-1820) turns out to
be 0.80 and 0.56 for England and the Netherlands, and 0.51, 0.31 for the case of Portugal and Spain
respectively. About the amount of trade empirical evidence suggest that it was not so big during this
period (ORourke and Williamsom, 2001) so this would imply that price movements were not so big, so
we will be in the cases described when  should be closed to one. While the share of labor in each sector
seems to be consistent with the evidence, the e¤ect in the growth rate seems to be overstated. At the
end of the XVIII th century, the share of population working on industry or services in The Netherlands
was around 60%. If we consider that by that time the institutional change in these economies have been
already made, this implies that our share of labor dedicated to manufacturing is extremely high. Only
similar results to those that we derive would be possible for the UK at the end of the XIXth century.
4.1 Decentralization
One of the main reasons why these large growth e¤ects appear in the previous exercise is given by the
fact that taxes are very high in autarky, so that opening to trade has a fall in taxes by 20%. This
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falling in taxes comes from the fact that landowners know that they can reduce prices and increase scal
income in real terms, when choosing taxes so in autarky, they choose a higher tax in order to get lower
prices.
What I did in this section is to consider that landowners do not consider the e¤ect of taxes on prices.
A way of motivating this could be for example decentralization. If we have a continuum of equally
endowed landowners each of them with a power to extract rents only on their own manor then, the
e¤ect that their own tax will have on the determination of the relative prices of the agricultural good
will be negligible so that they can ignore it. Notice that there would be still general equilibrium price
e¤ects of taxes, but these are not taken into account when making the tax decision.
This is equivalent to the problem solved in the small open economy case but taking into account that
the price pt is given by the labor and the nal goods market clearing conditions and therefore a¤ected
by taxes and given by the expression 17. The optimal tax comes from the following condition:

(1 + ) t + 
2(1   t)  2

=

1  

2(1   t)
2  (1   t)

(1   t)
which can be easily seen that satises the conditions for the uniqueness of the solution in  : The
solution for autarky:
regime  Lmtaxes Lataxes rtaxes gtaxes
taxes 0.6284 0.1468 0.8532 1.0113 1.0013
notaxes 0 0.3488 0.6512 1.0445 1.0342
The value for a in autarky is 382.75. The value for b obviously does not change since it only depends
on the growth rate of output.
When we open to trade results are given by the following table:
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.5
 0.7611 0.6621 0.6065 0.5742 0.5549 0.5431 0.5328
LMt 0.7612 0.5727 0.4159 0.2970 0.2127 0.1546 0.0996
r 1.0192 1.0217 1.0212 1.0194 1.0171 1.0147 1.0112
g 1.0091 1.0117 1.0111 1.0093 1.0071 1.0047 1.0012
Notice that there is still a reduction in taxes when we open to trade, but in this case it is
really very small. This is the consequence of the fact that in autarky taxes reduce agricultural prices
rising labor in the manufacturing sector and increasing marginal income of taxation. Openness to trade
reduces the incentives to put higher taxes because marginal income coming from taxation reduces as
prices are no longer a¤ected by taxes. However, although important, this e¤ect is relatively small. can
be seen again in the column where  = 1; so the autarkic price and the price under trade openness is
exactly equal.
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The results are very similar in qualitative terms, since in fact what we have eliminated is a
general reduction in taxes that comes from the general equilibrium price e¤ect13 . However, these results
change a lot in quantitative terms and as you can see the share of labor in the manufacturing sector
and the estimations of the growth rates seems to t quite well with the data previously commented.The
results for the institutional change are pretty similar and reported in the appendix.
5 Conclusions
We have set up a simple model in order to understand the role played by international trade on economic
growth through the evolution of the institutional environment. In a society in which the political
power is at the hands of a social group whose interests are in conict with economic growth, like for
example the aristocracy in Europe in the modern age, this social group will establish an institutional
environment which is bad for growth. This group, however, establishes institutions which do not lead
to full expropiation of the other social groups since full expropiation would lead to no investment and
no scal rents. The proccess of capital accumulation along time will allow the rival group to conquier
the political power, and to create growth-boostring institutional system.
In this context we want to examine the role played by international trade. We have considered the
case of a small open economy where the equilibrium prices are taken as given and equilibrium variables
are not a¤ected by the individual decissions. We have discovered that international trade plays a role
in the evolution of the institutional environment both, by changing the way production factors are
remunerated according to comparative advantage, what changes the return on capital, accumulation
and growth and through general equilibrium price e¤ects. If trade specialization pattern rises capital
rents, then capital accumulation becomes faster, accelerating the proccess of institutional change. An
interesting result is that due to the independence of prices to local conditions under free trade, the ellite
xes lower taxes, what it allows the country to grow more even if the country specializes in agricultural
goods. This goes against standard two sector endogenous growth models. However, the growth rate will
be lower than if the economy specializes in manufacuring.
We suggest that a similar story could be in the heart of the divergent experience of Spain and
Portugal on the one hand, and England and The Netherlands on the other hand when they were opened
to trade with the Americas. While Spain and Portugal were specializing in trade in raw materials in
the global world, reinforcing the economic and political power of the aristocracy, english and dutch
manufacturers and merchants were improving their economic position by exporting manufactured goods
having earlier experiences of social and political revolutions.Our model will predict that trade will
enhance institutional change in the four countries provided that the movement in relative prices was not
very high, but England and the Netherlands, should experiment higher growth and earlier institutional
change.
13Although not reported the main di¤erence in qualitative terms underlies on the fact that for high enough prices of the
agricultural good, the growth rate in free trade is lower than in autarky. That is now, not always free trade has positive
e¤ects on growth but still for a very big rank of prices that is the case.
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7 Appendix A Taxes in autarky
Proof. dV
k
t
dt
< 0:
Developing the expression of the indirect utility function we have:
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V kt =

2
(2  (1   t))

((1   t))
 
LMt
(1 )(1 )  
LAt
(1 )
Using (14), manipulating and rearranging terms we arrive to:
V kt =

LMt
LAt

((1   t))
 
LMt
(1 )(1 )  
LAt
(1 )
and operating we arrive to:
V kt = (1   t)
 
LMt
(1 (1 ))  
LAt
 
Then it is easy to see that the derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to taxes is equal
to zero, since dL
M
t
dt
< 0;
dLAt
dt
> 0:
Proposition 7 Proof. Taking derivatives and rearranging terms we arrive to the f.o.c.:
f = (1  )

2 (2+)
((2 (2+))(1 )+2   1 (1 )

  2(2 (1 )) + 
2+2(1 )
(2 (1 ))+2(1 ) = 0
This condition:
it goes to  1 when  = 1; and it is positive when  = 0:Moreover this function is continous in 
 (0; 1):The intermediate value thorem therefore says that there is an interior  ; on the interval (0; 1)
such that: f = 0:
Uniqueness is shown, rst by multiplying f for (1 ) and for simplicity we make a change of variables
calling x = (1  )
Then we have:
A B + C = 0
where
A = (1  )

(2 )x
(2 )x+2   12

B = 
2(1 )x
2(2 x)
C = (
2+2)(1 )x
2(1+) (2+2)x)
and notice that C and B are monotone in x:By taking derivatives in A with respect to x :
dA
dx =
2(1 )(2 )
((2 )x+2)2 > 0
and given that A;B;C;are continuous on the interval   (0; 1); then the proof reduces to show that :
A B + C > 0;
It can be shown algebraically that this is the case for  = 0:4: A general solution for all values of ;
remains to be shown.
8 Appendix B Taxes in small open economy
Proof. Substituting in the indirect utility function for the optimal values of labor LAt ; L
M
t ;and rear-
ranging terms we have that:
V At = ln
0B@ (pt ) 2 2 Tt +  t (pt ) 12 Kt(1   t) 1 
(pt )
1
 T + (1   t) 1Kt
1 
1CA
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Rearranging terms in the rst order condition for  t we get:
f(t ) = (1  t )
1 
 Kt
0@

1    1    t1 t  (pt ) 12
 (pt )
2 
2 Tt +  t (pt )
 1
2 Kt(1  t )
1 

1A 
(1  t )
1 
 Kt
 
1 


(pt )
1
 T + (1  t ) 1Kt
1  = 0
Notice that V At is continuous on the interval  t 2 [0; 1]; and the rst order condition is positive when
 = 0; and lim!1 f(t ) < 0; implying that  t must be interior.
Working on f(t ) we arrive to the following expression:
(ptT )
1


(1 + ) t + 
2(1  )  2 =  (1  ) 1+ (Kt) 1
where uniqueness is obtained directly applying the intermediate value theorem.
A graph illustrating the two curves is provided below.
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Notice that increases in capital stock shifts right hand side into the right rising taxes.
Notice that increases in prices rotates left hand side into the right reducing taxes. The same applies
for a rise in the endowment of land.
Q.E.D.
9 Appendix 3: Robustness
First  = 0:4 but  varies:
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 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8
 0.83 0.8 0.78 0.774 0.769 0.768 0.77 0.776
a 120.15 147.23 163.48 174.9 183.45 189.95 194.75 197.96
b 769.7307
f 0.772 0.711 0.672 0.643 0.619 0.5989 0.5797 0.5608
af 26.8 25.9 23.68 21.05 18.47 15.89 13.49 11.08
bf 122.45 98.53 83.83 72.44 63.39 55.44 48.8 42.69
Second  = 0:7;  varies.
 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8
 0.7925 0.7776 0.7704 0.7709 0.779 0.796 0.822 0.861
a 224.46 224.24 213.32 194.75 170.91 143.35 112.87 79.53
b 769.7307
f 0.5845 0.5539 0.5397 0.5797 0.638 0.7026 0.7682 0.8363
af 23.17 27.96 35.34 48.80 69.46 103.50 149.75 233.05
bf 12.28 12.47 12.66 13.49 15.71 19.39 23.76 28.36
Simulation for the decentralized case
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.5
af 25.16 24.61 26.18 29.41 35.71 50.28 181.27
bf 110.38 85.96 90.58 108.02 141.3 213.26 833.83
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